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Abstract 
In recent years, randomized controlled trials have become increasingly popular in the social 
sciences. In development economics in particular, their use has attracted considerable debate 
in relation to the identification of ‘what works’ in development policy. This paper focuses on 
a core topic in development policy: governance. It aims to address two key questions: (1) 
‘what have the main contributions of randomized controlled trials been to the study of 
governance?’ and (2) ‘what could be the contributions, and relatedly the limits of such 
methods?’. To address these questions, a systematic review of experimental and quasi-
experimental methods to study government performance was conducted. It identified 139 
relevant papers grouped into three major types of policy interventions that aim to: (1) 
improve supply-side capabilities of governments; (2) change individual behaviour through 
various devices, notably incentives, and (3) improve informational asymmetries. We find …/ 
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that randomized controlled trials can be useful in studying the effects of some policy 
interventions in the governance area, but they are limited in significant ways: they are ill-
equipped to study broader governance issues associated with macro-structural shifts, national 
level variation in institutions and political culture, and leadership. Randomized controlled 
trials are best for studying targeted interventions, particularly in areas of public goods 
provision, voting behaviour, and specific measures to address corruption and improve 
accountability; however, they can provide little traction on whether the intervention is 
transferable and ‘could work’ (and why) in other contexts, and in the longer run. 
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1 Introduction 
Experimental studies using randomized controlled trials (RCTs) have long been a staple of 
medical research. In recent years, these methods have also become increasingly popular in 
the social sciences. In development economics in particular, their use has attracted 
considerable debate with some scholars promoting them as the best means of identifying 
‘what works’ in development policy (Banerjee 2007; Glennerster and Kremer 2011), while 
others voice strong concerns about their growing hegemony in the field (see e.g., Deaton 
2009; Ravallion 2009).  
This paper focuses on the use of such methods in identifying ‘what works’ for one of the 
major topics in contemporary studies of development policy: governance. It asks two key 
questions: (1) what have the main contributions of RCTs been to the study of governance? 
and (2) what could be the contributions, and relatedly, the limits of such methods? Despite 
large separate literatures on governance and on experimental methods, very little work has 
directly considered both together in this way. This paper draws on reviews of both literatures, 
including a systematic review of experimental and quasi-experimental studies of government 
performance that is described further below. 
Broadly, this paper argues that RCTs have some, but limited utility in the study of 
governance. It discusses some of the key contributions that RCTs have made in the study of 
targeted interventions with relatively rapid results; howeverit also shows that major 
hypotheses about, e.g., macro-structural and cultural shifts over long periods of time, national 
level policy changes, and changes in political leadership are not amendable to study using 
RCTs.. Such limitations suggest that researchers should expect to use other methods to 
address these important areas in the field of development studies. 
This paper is divided into four parts. The first focuses on theories of governance, highlighting 
several major hypotheses from the literature about how the quality of governance changes. 
The second focuses on how RCTs have been used in the study of governance-related topics, 
highlighting some of the major findings from RCTs with respect to the provision of health, 
education, and other public goods; improvements in the performance of civil servants; and 
representation, participation, and deliberative democracy. The third part of the paper brings 
these two sections together, exploring whether and how RCTs could be used to address major 
theories of governance. A final section concludes. 
Discussion of experimental research, particularly in economics and political science, 
sometimes treat laboratory-type experiments, natural experiments, and RCTs or ‘field 
experiments’ together, irrespectively of their design features. Much of the discussion in this 
paper is applicable to various experimental methods, but the focus is on RCTs, which imply a 
slightly different approach than the others to the testing of causal hypotheses: in the simplest 
experimental designs, causal effects are assessed by comparing measures ‘with’ and ‘without’ 
an intervention. This is most straightforward in a laboratory setting where other key variables 
can be held constant and measures can be taken before and after an intervention. In this 
setting, causal inference is relatively clear: the intervention causes the difference.  
Many of the phenomena that we care about, however, are not amendable to this method. 
Outside of the laboratory setting, field experiments using RCTs study such phenomena using 
similar principles; because it is not always possible to hold constant all factors, in prospective 
 2
experimental designs, with baseline and endline data, the identification of the counterfactual 
is achieved via random assignment to treatment, where measures from randomly selected 
‘control’ and ‘treatment’ groups are taken before and after interventions, and the effect of the 
intervention then is the difference between ‘before’ and ‘after’ measures in the ‘treatment’ as 
compared to the ‘control’ groups (‘difference in difference’). This basic and elegant logic 
underlies hypothesis testing and impact evaluation using RCTs, by ensuring that in principle 
any difference between the treatment and control is not systematic at the outset of the 
experiment. 
2 Explaining governance 
Despite a wealth of literature on governance, even its definition remains contested 
(Gisselquist 2012; Keefer 2009). A large amount of the literature focuses on definition, 
conceptualization, and measurement (see, e.g., Arndt and Oman 2006; Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Zoido-Lobaton 1999; Rothstein and Teorell 2008; Thomas 2009). Without delving too much 
into these debates, this paper adopts a basic definition building on theories of government and 
the state. This work points to two major roles for public institutions in (1) providing public 
goods such as education, health care, water and sanitation facilities and social protection to 
the poor and vulnerable, and (2) aggregating interests with respect inter alia to how and 
which public goods are provided. The later role can be achieved both through electoral and 
non-electoral forms of participation and is closely linked to discussion of accountability.  
Public goods are better provided collectively than individually for reasons of efficiency and 
necessity (Goldin 1977; Samuelson 1954). As Putnam (1993) notes in his classic Making 
Democracy Work, ‘public institutions are devices for achieving purposes, not just for 
achieving agreement. We want government to do things, not just decide things – to educate 
children, pay pensioners, stop crime, create jobs, hold down prices, encourage family values, 
and so on’ (Putnam 1993: 8-9). Individuals and groups within a polity have varying 
preferences about the type and manner of public goods provision and other collective issues, 
and a second key role of government is in somehow ‘aggregating’ and representing such 
interests to make collective decisions. In short, as Levi (2006) summarizes, ‘Good 
governments are those that are (1) representative and accountable to the population they are 
meant to serve, and (2) effective—that is, capable of protecting the population from violence, 
ensuring security of property rights, and supplying other public goods that the populace needs 
and desires’ (Levi 2006: 5). By extension, the quality of governance, as understood here, 
varies in the degree to which governments fulfil these two related roles. 
Theories of government and the state suggest a number of explanations about why the quality 
of governance in this sense varies, both across polities and over time, highlighting a range of 
structural, institutional, and cultural factors, as well as individual agency. In general, this 
work deals with the two roles of government separately, offering explanations either for 
better representation and accountability (often framed in terms of the emergence of liberal 
democracy versus other forms of government), or for more effective public goods provision. 
Much work also focuses on explaining disaggregated governance outcomes, such as the 
provision of effective policing, secure property rights, universal health care, or high quality 
state-funded education.  
Far from having a single model of change in government performance, different theoretical 
traditions offer different and sometimes contradictory explanations for key governance 
outcomes. One example important both for theory and contemporary politics is what 
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constitutes good governance in terms of providing the institutional environment most 
conducive to economic growth. Friedman (1962), for instance, suggests that a ‘good’ 
government serves as a ‘rule maker’ and ‘umpire’ to create and enforce minimal rules, such 
as property rights and a monetary framework. Disciples of Keynes (1964), by contrast, see a 
more extensive role for ‘good’ governments in fiscal and monetary policy. Similarly, there 
are major debates over whether more or less regulation is most conducive to private sector 
development, and over the form that regulation should take (see Kirkpatrick 2012). 
One of the major structural factors highlighted in explanations of variation in the quality of 
governance is ‘modernization’ or the level of development. Max Weber, for instance, 
suggests that modernization leads to fundamental changes in the nature of authority, from 
traditional and charismatic towards rational-legal (the rule of law) (see Weber 2009). 
Modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s highlighted how economic growth led to 
fundamental structural changes in the economy and society, such as the growth of the middle 
class and middle class ideology, and the emergence of ‘cross pressures’, that led to greater 
popular participation in government and created the foundations for the emergence of 
democracy (see Lipset 1981). Later work has also highlighted modernization as a key factor 
in democratic governance, but challenged the specific mechanism proposed by the 
modernization theorists. Przeworski and Limongi (1997), for instance, argue that it is not that 
modernization leads to the emergence of democratic governance, but that democracy is more 
likely to endure (once it is born for other reasons) in countries at higher levels of economic 
development – in particular, they found, in countries with annual per capita incomes higher 
than US$6,000 (in 1985 dollars) (see also Przeworski et al. 2000). 
Other structural arguments highlight modernization and the class structure, positing different 
mechanisms. Moore (1966), for instance, argues that ‘the ways in which the landed upper 
classes and the peasants reacted to the challenge of commercial agriculture were decisive 
factors in determining the political outcome’ (Moore 1966: xxiii). As agrarian societies 
transformed, resulting bourgeois revolutions led to capitalist liberal democracy (e.g., 
England, France, and the United States), abortive bourgeois revolutions led to fascism (e.g., 
Japan), and peasant revolutions led to communism (e.g., Russia and China). Focusing also on 
France, Russia, and China, Skocpol (1979), by contrast, highlights the autonomous role of the 
state in relation both to domestic class and political forces and to other states. In all three 
cases, she argues, social revolutions led leaders to strengthen, centralize, and rationalize state 
organizations (public institutions). The different character of resulting political regimes is 
explained by variation in the socioeconomic legacies of the old regimes, international 
circumstances, and the ideology and process of state-building after the revolution. Another 
structural argument highlighting the same factors is proposed by Luebbert (1991), who 
explains four different regime types in interwar Europe as resulting from the path taken from 
preindustrial politics to the crises of the 1920s and 1930s and particular constellations of 
urban-rural coalitions: a centre-right coalition and the early inclusion of the working class led 
to liberal democratic governance (Britain, Switzerland, France), for instance, while an 
alliance of the urban working class and the middle peasantry led to social democracy or 
democratic corporatism (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Czechoslovakia). Other structural 
arguments highlight still other factors, such as the ethnic structure of society (e.g., Horowitz 
1985), geography (e.g., Herbst 2000), and the strength of society relative to the state (e.g., 
Migdal 1988), which may affect how difficult it is to govern a particular polity. 
Institutional explanations for governance outcomes are among the most diverse, highlighting 
a range of institutions and mechanisms. Indeed, social scientists often define institutions so 
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broadly – as formal and informal rules, norms, and organizations – that some of the 
‘structural’ explanations reviewed above and the cultural explanations reviewed below are 
sometimes treated in this camp (see Steinmo 2008).  
Since the 1990s, new institutionalist economics inspired by North (1990) and others has been 
particularly important in the thinking on governance underlying work by the World Bank and 
other multilateral development banks, which has focused on how the ‘rules of the game’ 
shape economic development (Grindle 2010). The World Bank’s 2012 strategy on 
governance, for instance, highlights its role in helping countries to ‘put in place institutions 
and systems that can become the foundations of sustainable growth’ (World Bank 2012). It 
highlights both the need to strengthen the capacity of institutions to enforce regulations, 
provide public services, and manage resources effectively, and to adopt the ‘right’ institutions 
(e.g., regulations favourable to private sector development). 
One of North’s (1990) key arguments that is echoed in many institutional explanations is the 
effect of institutional ‘lock in’ or path dependence that makes changing institutions costly, 
even when they are inefficient. North argues, for instance, that it was rather haphazard 
institutional choices that put England on a path toward efficient market economy, with 
relatively strong property rights, an impartial judicial system, and a fiscal system with 
expenditures tied to tax revenues, where other countries adopted different (and ultimately less 
effective) institutions that placed them on different paths.  
Other institutionalist work adopts more historical or sociological perspectives. Focusing on 
governance with respect to health care policy, for instance, Immergut (1992) argues that the 
structure of political institutions in Sweden, France, and Switzerland influenced whether they 
developed comprehensive national health care or more fragmented insurance programmes. 
Political institutions and procedures, rather than the demands of social groups, set the terms 
of political negotiations, leading to divergent outcomes.  
Institutionalists have also been vocal supporters of constitutional engineering and revision of 
electoral systems as a means of improving representation, accountability, and governance 
more generally, particularly in divided societies (see Sartori 1997, Reilly 2001). Many 
advocate for similar reasons for the reorganization of the state along more decentralized or 
federal lines. Consociational theory, for instance, proposes that governance in a state divided 
along ethnic, religious, or communal lines can be stable if democracy has four key 
institutional characteristics: a ‘grand coalition’ formed by the political leaders of various 
factions; a ‘mutual veto’, necessitating consensus among groups for political decisions; 
‘proportionality’, in that each group occupies a share of government posts proportional to its 
share of the population; and ‘segmental autonomy’, allowing autonomous rule for different 
groups (Lijphart 1977). The Netherlands, Switzerland, and Belgium offer positive examples, 
while critics highlight the failure of the consociational model in Lebanon. More recently, 
consociational recommendations were partially adopted in South Africa’s democratic 
transition and 1994 constitution, including a grand coalition government and proportional 
representation (Horowitz 1992).  
Cultural factors are also highlighted in explanations for governance variation. Tocqueville’s 
classic exploration of the role of political culture in explaining democracy in America is one 
example (see Tocqueville 2003). One of the major works on democratic governance in recent 
years, Putnam (1993) also highlights the role of political culture in explaining variation in 
government performance across Italian regions, noting that ‘Tocqueville was right: 
Democratic government is strengthened, not weakened, when it faces a vigorous civil 
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society’ (Putnam 1993: 182). Putnam takes advantage of a unique situation in which 15 new 
regional governments were established simultaneously in 1970 with similar constitutional 
structures and mandates, but some performed better than others. In explaining why, he argues 
that while socioeconomic factors certainly play a role (explaining, for instance, why northern 
regions on average performed better than southern regions), the level of social capital – 
patterns of civic engagement and social solidarity –is far more important in ‘making 
democracy work’. Social capital works largely to facilitate resolution of collective action 
dilemmas, making it easier to carry out public projects and facilitating stronger public 
engagement and oversight. Although social capital can be built in the short-term, he argues, it 
is not easy. He argues that in Italy this variation in social capital has long roots stretching 
back to early medieval history, in which northern regions had stronger traditions of self-
government and horizontal collaboration and relied less on vertical hierarchy than southern 
regions.  
Finally, a significant body of work focuses on the role of individuals, and especially political 
leaders, in effecting governance outcomes. Although his name has come to be associated with 
a particular style of (ruthless) leadership, Machiavelli famously highlighted the potentially 
decisive role of leaders (‘princes’). In Machiavelli’s Children, Samuels (2003), for instance, 
explores the role of political and business leaders in 19th and 20th century state-building in 
Japan and Italy. Jackson and Rosberg (1982) map the roles and influences of different 
leadership styles across Sub-Saharan African countries, highlighting four broad models: 
prices and oligarchic rule (Senghor in Senegal, Kenyatta in Kenya, Tubman and Tolbert in 
Liberia, Selassie in Ethiopia, Sobhuza II in Swaziland, and Nimeiri in Sudan), autocrats and 
lordship (Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d’Ivoire, Ahidjo in Cameroon, Bongo in Gabon, Banda 
in Malawi, and Sese Seko in Zaire), prophets (Nkrumah in Ghana, Touré in Guinea, and 
Nyerere in Tanzania), and tyrants and abusive rulers (Macías in Equatorial Guinea and Amin 
in Uganda). 
Major theories of public policy similarly identify the key role of individuals. Kingdon’s 
(1995) model of policy-making, for instance, posits three ‘streams of processes’: problems, 
policies, and politics. ‘Policy windows’, which may arise predictably (such as during a vote 
on legislation) or suddenly (when problems arise), are periods during which the three streams 
are combined and issues may rise on the policy agency. ‘Policy entrepreneurs’ take advantage 
of policy windows to push their agendas and particular policy solutions.  
In summary, the study of how and how well governments govern is central to the study of 
politics, and the field offers a variety of structural, institutional, cultural, and other arguments 
to explain both variation in the quality of ‘governance’ broadly defined and particular aspects 
of it. The brief discussion here is by no means exhaustive, but intended to provide a broad 
introduction to major arguments in the literature.   
3 Findings from experimental work 
In one of the earliest reviews on the use of field experiments to study contemporary 
governance issues, Humphreys and Weinstein (2009) identify four major questions in which 
researchers have primarily focused, namely: (1) what is the role of political institutions in the 
process of decision-making and policy implementation? (2) How do social norms and 
informal institutions affect individual and collective action? (3) What is the impact of 
information and incentives on political behaviour, notably accountability? And (4) how can 
violence and conflict be prevented? The authors cover a limited number of studies and 
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acknowledge that ‘there has not yet been a significant accumulation of knowledge from the 
use of field experiments in the political economy of development […] For this reason, we 
focus more on the promise of the field than on its achievements’ (Humphreys and Weinstein 
2009: 370).  
In a subsequent review of experimental research on governance, Moehler (2010a) focuses on 
the related question of whether field experiments can ‘be productively employed to study the 
impact of development assistance on democracy and governance outcomes?’ (Moehler 
2010a: 30). She highlights several key weaknesses of field experiments, but is generally 
sanguine about the possibilities: ‘The enterprise of DG field experiments’, she notes, ‘will be 
constrained more by mundane challenges to successful research design and implementation 
than by the inherent limitations of field experiments’ (Moehler 2010a: 42). Her review 
identifies 41 randomized field experiments of interest in the developing world, including 11 
dealing with elections, ten with community-driven development, nine with government 
performance in public service delivery, three with the use of quotas, and seven with other 
topics. The majority of the reported studies (22) were conducted in Africa, and nine in India.  
More recently, Olken and Pande (2011b) conducted a narrative although not a systematic 
review of the literature, following a principal-agent approach to governance. They include in 
the review 16 studies that adopt rigoruous experimental and non-experimental methods to 
establish causality in the analysis of policies that aim to improve governance in developing 
countries. More specifically, they divide the literature into two broader areas: (1) 
participation and participatory institutions to exercise greater control over politicians, and (2) 
the roots of corruption and the incentives and institutional features that can prevent rent-
seeking behaviour and leakages.1 
In order to address any potential threat of publication bias, a systematic review of published 
and unpublished papers using rigorous experimental and quasi-experimental methods to study 
governance was conducted as part of the research for the study of which this paper is a part 
(Gisselquist, Niño-Zarazúa, and Sajuría forthcoming). It identified 139 relevant papers. 
According to our classification, which is derived from the basic definition of governance 
adopted in this paper, we identify three major types of policy interventions that overall cluster 
around the provision of public goods and aggregating interests, and aim to (1) improve 
supply-side capabilities of governments, and the social and political institutions that facilitate 
that process; (2) change individual behaviour through various devices, notably incentives, 
and (3) improve informational asymmetries. 
Our typology varies from the ones described above in the sense that the first set of factors, 
focus on the ‘supply’-side dimensions of policies, affecting how public institutions 
themselves supply goods and social services. Improved governance in that context involves 
changes both to what is provided (e.g., books and classrooms) and the quality of services 
(e.g,, via a reduction in absenteeism by teachers). The second and third set of factors directly 
influence the ‘demand’-side for government-provided goods and services, i.e., how the 
population (usually individuals, households, and occasionally communities) interact with 
public institutions. Demand-side interventions are found to either provide incentives (often 
cash), or better information about the provision of goods and services, both with the objective 
of changing demand-side behaviour.  
 
                                                
1 For a review on the specific topic of corruption, see Olken and Pande (2011a) 
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As shown in Table 1, the largest number of papers identified under the governance cluster of 
‘aggregating interests’ focus on institutions and corruption, while 27 studies address issues 
related to participation, including voting behaviour and eight adress non-electoral forms of 
participation. Similarly, under the ‘provision of public goods’ cluster, we find that the largest 
number of studies (42) focus on health care and education policies, whereas other studies 
focus on issues related to employment, water and sanitation, and housing. The largest number 
of studies in our sample was conducted in the USA and India (see Table A1 in the Appendix) 
 
 
Table 1: Experimental and quasi-experimental studies to study governance 
Governance 
cluster 
 Type of policy 
intervention 
 Policy area 
     
Aggregating 
interests (74) 
 
49 out of 74 studies 
adopted 
experimental 
research designs; 
however, more than 
half had to resort to 
quasi-experimental 
regression 
techniques such as 
propensity score 
matching and 
instrumental 
variables to address 
issues related to 
endogeneity, 
spillovers, and 
sample 
contamination 
 
Improve supply-
side capabilities 
(29) 
 
 Accountability and 
corruption (2)   
  
Democracy (1) 
  
  
Ethnicity (2) 
  
  
Institutional building (18) 
  
  Non-electoral forms of 
participation (3)   
  Voting behaviour (3) 
  
    
    
 
Change behaviour 
via incentives (20) 
 Accountability and 
corruption (5)   
  
Institutional building (6) 
  
  Non-electoral forms of 
participation (4)   
  Voting behaviour (5) 
  
    
    
 
Improve 
information 
asymmetries (25) 
 Accountability and 
corruption (1)   
  
Institutional building (4) 
  
  Non-electoral forms of 
participation (1)   
  Voting behaviour (19) 
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Several recent studies also review related findings from RCTs with respect to development 
more generally. Banerjee and Duflo (2012), for instance, draw largely on the results of their 
work at the MIT Poverty Action Lab to propose new solutions to global poverty, highlighting 
the role of ‘ideology, ignorance, and inertia’ in explaining why aid is not always effective. In 
particular, many of their solutions point to how the poor lack critical information and hold 
incorrect beliefs (e.g., about the benefits to education) that help to perpetuate their poverty.  
They highlight findings from RCTs dealing with hunger, health, education, family planning, 
risk management, microfinance, and entrepreneurship. Karlan and Appel (2012) build a 
similar argument about solutions to global poverty, also drawing heavily on findings from 
RCTs. The ‘seven ideas that work’ that they highlight are: microsavings, reminders to save, 
Governance 
cluster  
Type of policy 
intervention  Policy area 
Provision of public 
goods (65) 
 
22 out of 65 studies 
adopted 
experimental 
research designs; 
however, 11 of those 
had to resort to 
quasi-experimental 
regression 
techniques such as 
propensity score 
matching and 
instrumental 
variables to address 
issues related to 
endogeneity, 
spillovers, and 
sample 
contamination 
 
 
Improve supply-
side capabilities 
(18) 
 
Health and/or education 
(12) 
  
  
Water and/or sanitation (3) 
  
  
Employment (2) 
  
  
Social protection (1) 
  
    
    
 
Change behaviour 
via incentives (35) 
 Health and/or education 
(23)   
  
Water and/or sanitation (1) 
  
  
Employment (5) 
  
  
Social protection (4) 
  
  
Rural development (1) 
  
  
Housing (1) 
  
    
    
 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries (12) 
 Health and/or education 
(7)   
  
Water and/or sanitation (3) 
  
  
Employment (1) 
  
  Non-electoral forms of 
participation (1) 
Note: number of reviewed studies in brackets. 
Source: compiled by authors. 
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prepaid fertilizer sales, deworming, remedial education in small groups, chlorine dispensers 
for clean water, and commitment devices (Karlan and Appel 2012: 272-275). 
In summary, a number of findings emerge from review of the literature on RCTs that are 
relevant to explaining variations in the quality of governance. As Banerjee and Duflo’s 
(2012) and Karlan and Appel’s (2012) books suggest, many of these relate to the ways in 
which governments (or donors) can improve the provision of basic public goods, particularly 
in the areas of health care, sanitation, and education. A number of these studies deal with the 
impact of projects on providing specific goods or services. In their study of the Primary 
School Deworming Project in Kenya, for instance, Miguel and Kremer (2004) find that the 
programme not only improved students’ health in both treatment schools and neighbouring 
schools, but also reduced school absenteeism by a quarter (although there was no evidence of 
an effect on academic test scores). In demonstrating the impact of expanded insurance 
coverage on improved health outcomes among children, Quimbo et al. (2011) draw on the 
Quality Improvement Demonstration Study in the Philippines to show that zero co-payments 
and increased enrolment were associated after release from the hospital with reduced 
likelihood of wasting and of having an infection (9-12 and 4-9 per cent respectively). Kremer, 
Miguel, and Thorton (2009) evaluate the impact of a merit scholarship programme in Kenya 
in which girls who scored well on exams had school fees paid and received a grant, finding 
that the programme had an effect not only on improved student test scores, but also on 
teacher attendance.  
A number of studies explore the impact of public information campaigns on public goods 
provision. Pandey, Goyal, and Sundararaman (2009), for instance, evaluate the impact of a 
community-based information campaign across three Indian states consisting of eight or nine 
public meetings to disseminate information to communities about its state-mandated roles 
and responsibilities in school management. They find the largest impacts on teacher effort, 
and more modest improvements on student learning and the delivery of benefits to students 
(stipends, uniforms, and mid-day meal). Also in India, Pattanayak et al. (2009) explore the 
impact of the intensified ‘information, education, and communication’ campaign carried out 
in Orissa as part of the nationwide Total Sanitation Campaign to change rural household 
attitudes about the use of latrines. The study found that latrine ownership rose significantly in 
treatment villages and remained the same in control villages.  
Pattanayak et al. (2009) further address the question of whether social and emotional costs 
(‘shaming’) or financial incentives (‘subsidies’) better influence behaviour. They find that 
although latrine ownership rose most among households below the poverty line and eligible 
for a government subsidy (5 to 36 per cent), it also rose among wealthier households not 
eligible for the subsidy (7 to 26 per cent), suggesting that shaming, even in the absence of 
subsidies, can work to change behaviour.  
Conditional cash transfers as a strategy have received particular attention and been evaluated 
in several different contexts. A number of studies focus on Mexico’s Progresa/Oportunidades 
programme (e.g., De La O 2008; Stecklov et al. 2007). Leroy et al. (2008) for instance, find 
the programme to be associated with better growth in infants below six months of age (but to 
have no impact for babies 6-24 months). Other studies explore the impact of conditional cash 
penalty programmes. One example is Dee’s (2011) study of the effects in ten counties of the 
state of Wisconsin’s Learnfare programme, which sanctions a family’s welfare grant when 
teenagers in the family do not meet school attendance targets. Data suggest evidence in nine 
counties that Learnfare increased school enrolment by 3.5 per cent and attendance by 4.5 per 
cent. 
 10
Another set of experimental studies focus on interventions to improve the performance of 
public sector employees such as teachers and nurses. Multiple studies highlight the impact of 
financial incentives. Duflo and Hanna (2005), for instance, find that a financial incentive 
programme immediately reduced teacher absenteeism in rural India, which was also 
associated with an improvement in student test scores and achievement one year after the 
start of the programme. Basinga et al. (2011) find in Rwanda that adoption of performance-
based payment of health-care providers (‘P4P’) was related to improvements in the use and 
quality of child and maternal care services, including a 23 per cent increase in the number of 
institutional deliveries and increases in the number of preventive care visits by children (56 
per cent for those 23 months and younger, and 132 per cent for those 24-59 months), and 
improvements in prenatal quality as measured by compliance with Rwandan prenatal care 
clinical practice guidelines. Other studies explore the impact of relatively minor 
administrative reforms: Banerjee et al. (2012) test the impact of four low-cost reforms across 
police stations in eleven districts in Rajasthan. Results suggest that two of these reforms – 
freezing staff transfers between police stations and providing in-service training in 
investigation skills and ‘soft’ skills like communication and leadership – were effective in 
improving police effectiveness and public satisfaction, while the other two reforms – placing 
community observers in police stations and a weekly duty rotation – were not effective. 
A growing body of experimental work also studies issues related to aggregating interests 
through the study of elections in new and emerging democracies. Wantchekon (2009), for 
instance, explores whether public deliberation – in the form of town meetings – can 
overcome clientelism in Benin. The experimental data show a positive effect on perceived 
knowledge about policies and candidates and on voter turnout, as well as increased electoral 
support for the candidates participating in the intervention. Collier and Vicente (2008) 
evaluate the effect of a campaign against political violence run by an NGO in Nigeria, 
involving town meetings, popular theatres, and door-to-door distribution of material. They 
find that this intervention served to reduce the intensity of election-related violence. Hyde 
(2010a) shows that the presence of election observers had an effect on election quality in the 
2004 Indonesian presidential elections, measured in terms of votes cast for the incumbent. 
Ichino and Schündeln (2012) study the effect of domestic observers on voter registration in 
Ghana in 2008. They find that because parties operate over large areas, observers in one 
registration centre may displace irregularities to others, which suggests the need for some 
revisions to how such observers are deployed in many countries. 
Finally, a number of studies explore topics at the intersection of representation and public 
service provision, with particular attention to the impact of community-based monitoring 
initiatives. Björkman and Svensson (2009), for instance, find in Uganda that holding 
meetings among community members and health workers to discuss health services and how 
to improve them, to compare citizen and health worker views of service provision, and to 
collectively discuss patient rights and provider responsibilities, led to improved health 
outcomes (reduced child mortality and increased child weight), as well as more community 
monitoring of health care a year after the intervention. Olken (2010) explores the relationship 
between direct democracy and local public goods provision in rural Indonesia, studying 
plebiscites introduced in some villages to replace a meeting-based process presumably 
dominated by elites. Plebiscites were associated with higher public satisfaction and perceived 
benefits from the project, greater willingness to contribute, and increased knowledge about 
the project. On the other hand, Olken’s (2007) study of ‘top down’ versus grassroots 
participation in corruption monitoring in Indonesia suggests that government-led approaches 
may be the more effective on this issue. Increasing government audits had a significant effect 
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on reducing corruption in term of reducing missing expenditures and discrepancies between 
official project costs and independent estimates of costs, while increasing grassroots 
participation had little impact. 
In summary, findings from RCTs highlight a range of strategies, projects, and other 
inventions that governments could adopt to improve public service provision and 
representation and accountability in particular areas. Inventions that have been explored in 
multiple contexts include public information campaigns, conditional cash transfers, financial 
incentives to improve the performance of public sector employees, community-based 
monitoring, and public deliberation at the local level. 
4 The limits of experimental methods in the study of governance 
The elegance of RCT findings arguably has a tendency to promote method-driven, rather than 
theory-driven, research: in other words, it tends to encourage work that asks what questions 
can be addressed with RCTs, rather than work that begins with questions that are seen as 
most important to answer and then proposes hypotheses and assesses whether RCTs are an 
appropriate method for testing them. In Section 3, we summarized some key findings based 
on RCTs that are relevant to governance. This section considers this summary in light of the 
review of theories of governance presented above, exploring the extent to which RCTs have – 
or could – contribute to the testing and building of hypotheses that follow from this long-
standing discussion.  
One related criticism levelled at experimental work is that it does not address ‘big’ questions 
and ‘big’ theories (Hyde 2010b). If we compare the factors explored in the RCTs with those 
identified in the theories of governance reviewed above, there is certainly something to that 
criticism. One of the major questions in the literature on government, for instance, is about 
the factors leading to particular regime types, a question completely absent from 
experimental work. Similarly, major theories of governance highlight factors like social 
structure that are also largely absent as an object of study in experimental evaluations.  
On the other hand, proponents of RCTs make a compelling argument that their avoidance of 
‘grand theory’ could be a strength of the literature. Banerjee and Duflo (2012), for instance, 
advocate a decidedly incremental and ‘micro’ approach. Their solutions posit that governance 
can be improved with small policy reforms that at the ‘margin’ can lead to desirable 
improvements in policy, and without major changes to social and political structures. Karlan 
and Appel (2012) contend that ‘up in the realm of high-minded concepts….the air is thin and 
there are no poor people to be found…[development] needs to be on the ground’ (Appel 
2012: 37). This is in stark contrast with prominent ‘grand’ theories of development that 
emphasize the role of political institutions in the process of economic development and 
democratic governance (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). 
However, despite their explicit rejection of ‘grand theory’, it should also be acknowledged 
that these approaches are not absent of theoretical underpinnings, and in the case of 
experimental research in particular, analysis often falls clearly within the tradition of 
behavioural economics, drawing on its theories of individual behaviour, (ir)rational choice, 
and information.  
Compelling as it is in some contexts, this ‘micro’ focus exacerbates one of the key 
weaknesses highlighted about experimental work: the low external validity of its findings, 
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despite the fact that the key strength is the high internal validity of its findings. If findings 
from RCTs are to be used to identify generalizeable impacts – i.e., in which specific 
experiments, conducted in particular situations, can help to predict the impact of similar 
interventions in other situations – experimental work must be able to say something about the 
broader context. Precisely because experimental researchers tend to adopt such ‘micro’ 
approaches to research enquiry, and eschew more high level theorizing about what within 
particular contexts might be unique or have influenced results, experimental studies tend to 
lend almost no empirically – or theoretically – grounded leverage on the question of whether 
similar outcomes might be expected in other contexts. 
One strategy for improving external validity in experimental research involves precisely 
speaking to broader theoretical propositions, including drawing on structural theory (Martel 
Garcia and Wantchekon 2010). But a degree of uncertainty remains with regard to the 
underlying mechanisms that explain, under a theoretical framework, the distribution of policy 
outcomes for a particular group (treatment and control) vis-à-vis the distribution for the entire 
population. And this constraint inevitably forces us to look beyond experimental methods 
alone in the study of governance.  
Of particular importance is in that context the fact that unlike RCTs that were undertaken for 
medical research, experimental designs in the field of development and governance pose 
significant logistical and methodological challenges that often result in the implementation of 
quasi-experimental regression techniques to tackle the problems of cofounding, selection 
bias, spillovers, and impact heterogeneity that RCTs aim to avoid in the first place (Deaton 
2009). Our review of the literature reveals that more than half of the studies that adopted 
experimental research designs had to resort to quasi-experimental regression techniques such 
as propensity score matching and instrumental variables techniques to address issues related 
to endogeneity, spillovers, and sample contamination (see Table 1).  
Furthermore, because experiments are relatively rarely replicated across multiple contexts, 
empirical data that help experimental researchers to address the external validity challenge 
are limited and often lacking in many developing country contexts. Thus, adopting more of 
this sort of replication is a strategy that has been recently explored and supported by private 
and public organizations promoting impact evaluations of development interventions, and 
which could in principle complement a broader theoretical view. However, as important as 
experimental design replication may be, researchers are faced with the ultimate challenge of 
overcoming external validity by the simple fact that parameter heterogeneity is commonly 
driven by economy-wide and institutional factors that cannot be easily controlled. This often 
leads to the implicit assumption of constant treatment effects across contexts in systematic 
reviews and meta-regression analyses. 
A third limit to RCTs in the study of governance is in the type of causal factors that they can 
reasonably study. This constraint follows partly from the need for large numbers of units to 
be studied in order to gain precise estimates, which encourage researchers to focus on low 
level factors, rather than on factors held by higher level units, such as national institutions 
(Moehler 2010b). Some traction on such factors can be gained by ‘scaling up’ findings from 
low level factors. For instance, studies of deliberative democracy at the village level may be 
used to study deliberative democracy at the national level. However, village versus national 
politics are so different in other ways that this sort of scaling up clearly provides only 
suggestive evidence of how deliberative democracy might function.  
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The limits on the causal factors that RCTs can study also follow from the simple inability of 
researchers to manipulate some key variables identified in the literature, such as the level of 
development, national institutions, culture, or the quality of national leadership. Putnam’s 
(1993) study of new regional governments in Italy, for instance, serendipitously gave him a 
natural experiment to exploit with RCT inspired tools, but most experimental researchers are 
not so lucky.  
In other cases, ethical considerations may impede the study of particular factors. Wantchekon 
(2003), for instance, explores the impact on voting in Benin of electoral platforms 
highlighting either public goods provision or ‘clientilist’ promises to ones’ ethno-region. 
Although he was able to work with political parties to place varied electoral platforms, he 
was only able to run the experiment in ‘safe’ districts where it was not expected to matter to 
election results. Furthermore, it would have been intellectually interesting if his study had 
more directly tested whether divisive ethnic appeals garnered more or fewer votes, but 
designing interventions in that way could have exacerbated ethnic tensions in a way that 
would simply have been unethical.  
A fourth issue that limits the utility of RCTs in the study of governance is their relatively 
short-term window of analysis. Indeed, many theories of governance (and development) 
focus on ‘non-linear’ processes that evolve over decades, while RCTs rarely look at impacts 
beyond the ‘linear’ trajectory between two points in time, usually a few years. Take, for 
example, the hypothetical case of a J-shaped curve derived from the long-term relationship 
between economic liberalization and political stability: in the short-term, economic 
liberalization may lead to a sudden rupture between economic and political actors that cause 
an increase in political instability. An RCT may conclude that economic liberalization is bad 
for political stability. However, if theory predictions are correct, once markets and 
institutions are developed further, political stability would actually improve (Gans-Morse and 
Nichter 2008). Although the time horizons of RCTs could be extended somewhat, they would 
still not be long enough to explore many of the major theories of governance. 
Fifth, RCTs are similarly limited in terms of the unit of analysis upon which they can 
evaluate impacts, which is generally the individual. Some studies focus on other units of 
analysis, such as voting constituencies or local regions, but no studies of which we are aware 
conduct experiments at the national level. This is simply due to the fact that the treatment 
effects arising from policy interventions are often small, and therefore large sample sizes are 
needed to conclude, with enough statistical power, that the differences between the treatment 
and control groups are unlikely to be due to chance. This connects to the final issue: the cost 
of RCTs. Randomization by group or cluster is often used in medical science to lower the 
cost of RCTs via phased implementation. This approach significantly decreases the cost of 
running studies, particularly in contexts where the outcomes of interest are easily assessed; 
however, even if they could be adapted to address some key theories of governance, it is not 
necessarily clear whether they would be more cost-effective in testing these theories than 
regression methods. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper argues that RCTs have been and can be useful in studying the effects of some 
policy interventions in the governance area, but that their use in the study of governance is 
also limited in significant ways, particularly by the nature of the factors that we expect to 
matter most. RCTs are best for studying targeted interventions (particularly in areas of public 
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goods provision, voting behaviour, and specific measures to address corruption and improve 
accountability), where it is expected to have rapid results, but theories of government and the 
state suggest that what might be most important in explaining variation in governance 
outcomes are broad, macro-structural shifts, national level variation in institutions and 
political culture, and leadership. 
The focus in this paper has been on the use of RCTs to test hypotheses about why the quality 
of governance varies. If our focus is narrower on precisely what individual, household, or 
community factors policy makers might affect that would matter to governance, RCTs appear 
to be a bit more promising. Policy makers also cannot rapidly change the macrostructure of 
their country; they govern within the constraints of that structure. Thus, the sorts of 
interventions studied by RCTs may be precisely of the sort that are most relevant to many 
policy makers. 
However, even adopting this more narrow focus, RCTs have significant weaknesses. For one, 
policy makers can concentrate their efforts on changing causal factors identified in the 
literature, such as national institutions and social capital that RCTs cannot. RCTs provide 
little insight into whether such efforts would be worthwhile. In addition, the inherently weak 
external validity of RCTs raises major questions about whether policy makers in other 
contexts and constituencies should expect to see the same results from an RCT-tested 
intervention. In short, RCTs can tell us ‘what works’ in one specific context, but they can 
provide little traction on whether the intervention is transferable and ‘could work’ (and why) 
in other contexts.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Experimental and quasi-experimental studies to study governance 
 
GOVERNANCE 
CLUSTER Author(s) Title Year 
Type of 
publicatio
n 
Country Policy area Aim of intervention 
Experi
mental 
design? 
Analytical 
methods 1/ 
A
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
i
n
g
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
s
 
Kroon et al. 
Police Intervention in Riots: 
The Role of Accountability 
and Group Norms. A Field 
Experiment 
1991 Journal article Germany Accountability 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes MANOVA 
Duflo et al. 
Efficiency and Rent Seeking 
in Local Government: 
Evidence from Randomized 
Policy Experiments in India 
2005 Working paper India 
Accountability 
and 
corruption 
Improve supply-
side capabilities Yes OLS 
Janssen et al. 
Coordination and 
Cooperation in Asymmetric 
Commons Dilemmas 
2011 Journal article USA 
Cooperation 
and 
participation 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
Yes OLS 
Asthana 
Decentralization and 
Corruption Revisited: 
Evidence from a Natural 
Experiment 
2012 Journal article India Corruption 
Improve supply-
side capabilities No DiD, OLS 
Tyrefors 
Do Merging Local 
Governments’ Free Ride on 
their Counterparts when 
Facing Boundary Reform? 
2009 Journal article Sweden Corruption 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
No DiD 
Bertrand et al. 
Obtaining a Driver's License 
in India: An Experimental 
Approach to Studying 
Corruption 
2007 Journal article India Corruption 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
Yes FE 
Fried et al. 
Corruption and Inequality at 
the Crossroad: A Multi-
method Study of Bribery and 
Discrimination in Latin 
America 
2010 Journal article Mexico Corruption 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
Yes OLS 
 20
Olken 
Monitoring Corruption: 
Evidence from a Field 
Experiment in Indonesia 
2007 Journal article Indonesia Corruption 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(monitoring) 
Yes OLS, FE 
Azfar and 
Nelson 
Transparency, Wages, and 
the Separation of Powers: 
An Experimental Analysis of 
Corruption 
2007 Journal article USA Corruption 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(voters) 
Yes OLS, Probit, and RE 
Kalyvitis and 
Vlachaki 
When Does More Aid Imply 
Less Democracy? An 
Empirical Examination 
2011 Journal article  Democracy 
Improve supply-
side capabilities No 2SLS 
Glennerster  
et al. 
Working Together: 
Collective Action in Diverse 
Sierra Leone Communities 
2009 Working paper Sierra Leone 
Ethnic 
diversity 
Improve supply-
side capabilities No IV, OLS 
Habyarimana 
et al. 
Why Does Ethnic Diversity 
Undermine Public Goods 
Provision? 
2007 Journal article Uganda 
Ethnic 
diversity 
Improve supply-
side capabilities Yes OLS, FE 
Paul 
Relief Assistance to 1998 
Flood Victims: A 
Comparison of the 
Performance of the 
Government and NGOs 
2003 Journal article Bangladesh 
Institutional 
building 
Improve supply-
side capabilities No ANOVA 
Roy 
Governance and 
Development: The 
Challenges for Bangladesh 
2005 Journal article Bangladesh 
Institutional 
biudling 
Improve supply-
side capabilities No 
PCA, 2SLS and 
OLS 
Beath et al. 
Winning Hearts and Minds 
through Development: 
Evidence from a Field 
Experiment in Afghanistan 
2012 Working paper Afghanistan 
Institutional 
biudling 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(grants and 
councils 
organization) 
Yes FE and PSM 
Scott 
Assessing Determinants of 
Bureaucratic Discretion: An 
Experiment in Street level 
Decision Making 
1997 Journal article USA 
Institutional 
building 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes OLS 
Djankov et al. Disclosure by Politicians 2010 Journal article  
Institutional 
building 
Improve supply-
side capabilities No OLS 
Lokshin and 
Yemtsov 
Has Rural Infrastructure 
Rehabilitation in Georgia 
Helped the Poor? 
2005 Journal article Georgia 
Institutional 
building 
Improve supply-
side capabilities No PSM, DiD 
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Chattopadhyay 
and Duflo 
Women as Policy Makers: 
Evidence from a 
Randomized Policy 
Experiment in India  
2004 Journal article India 
Institutional 
building + 
Participation 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(women quotas) 
Yes OLS 
Wallen et al. 
Implementing Evidence-
based Practice: 
Effectiveness of a Structured 
Multifaceted Mentorship 
Programme 
2010 Journal article USA 
Institutional 
building 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
No 
Correlational 
tests, and 
parametric stats 
Olson et.al. 
Governance and Growth: A 
Simple Hypothesis 
Explaining Cross-Country 
Differences in Productivity 
Growth  
2000 Journal article  
Institutional 
building + 
productivity 
Improve supply-
side capabilities No FE 
Lassen and 
Serritzlew 
Jurisdiction Size and Local 
Democracy: Evidence on 
Internal Political Efficacy 
from Large-scale Municipal 
Reform 
2011 Journal article Denmark 
Institutional 
building 
Improve supply-
side capabilities No 
DiD and  
PSM 
Wang et al. 
Fiscal Reform and Public 
Education Spending: A 
Quasi-natural Experiment 
of Fiscal Decentralization in 
China 
2012 Journal article China 
Institutional 
building 
Improve supply-
side capabilities No 
DiD, with RE 
and FE 
Bjørnskov et al. 
The Bigger the Better? 
Evidence of the Effect of 
Government Size on Life 
Satisfaction around the 
World 
2007 Journal article Worldwide 
Institutional 
building 
Improve supply-
side capabilities No OLS and 2LSL 
Pettersson-
Lidbom 
Does the Size of the 
Legislature Affect the Size of 
Government? Evidence from 
Two 
Natural Experiments 
2011 Journal article 
Finland and 
Sweden. 
Institutional 
building 
Improve supply-
side capabilities No RD 
Alence 
Political Institutions and 
Developmental Governance 
in Sub-Saharan Africa 
2004 Journal article 
sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Institutional 
building 
Improve supply-
side capabilities No WLS 
Corazzini et al. 
A Prize To Give For: An 
Experiment on Public Good 
Funding Mechanisms 
2010 Journal article  
Institutional 
building 
Improve supply-
side capabilities Yes OLS 
Matkin and Metropolitan Governance: 2009 Journal USA Institutional Change Yes Ordered Logit 
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Frederickson Institutional Roles and Inter-
jurisdictional Cooperation 
article building behaviour via 
incentives 
Thurmaier 
Budgetary Decision-making 
in Central Budget Bureaus: 
An Experiment 
1992 Journal article USA 
Institutional 
building 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes OLS 
Drummond and 
Mansoor 
Macroeconomic 
Management and the 
Devolution of Fiscal Powers 
2003 Journal article International 
Institutional 
building 
Improve supply-
side capabilities No 
OLS, Cluster 
analysis 
Gibson et al. 
Why Do People Accept 
Public Policies They 
Oppose? Testing Legitimacy 
Theory with a Survey-Based 
Experiment  
2005 Journal article USA 
Institutional 
building 
Improve supply-
side capabilities Yes OLS 
Olken 
Direct Democracy and Local 
Public Goods: Evidence 
from a Field Experiment in 
Indonesia 
2010 Journal article Indonesia 
Institutional 
building 
Improve supply-
side capabilities Yes Logit 
Yip and 
Eggleston 
Addressing Government and 
Market Failures with 
Payment Change Behaviour 
via Incentivess: Hospital 
Reimbursement Reform in 
Hainan, China 
2004 Journal article China 
Institutional 
building 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(reform) 
No DiD 
Batista and 
Vicente 
Do Migrants Improve 
Governance at Home? 
Evidence from a Voting 
Experiment 
2011 Journal article Cape Verde 
Institutional 
building + 
accountability 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
No IV, FE 
Grimmelik-
huijsen 
Linking Transparency, 
Knowledge and Citizen Trust 
in Government: an 
Experiment 
2012 Journal article Netherlands 
Institutional 
building + 
accountability 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes ANOVA, MANCOVA 
Korberg and 
Clarke 
Beliefs About Democracy 
and Satisfaction with 
Democratic Government: 
The Canadian Case 
1994 Journal article Canada 
Institutional 
building + 
democracy 
Improve supply-
side capabilities No Probit 
Cummings  
et al. 
Tax Morale Affects Tax 
Compliance: Evidence from 
Surveys and an Art Factual 
Field Experiment 
2009 Journal article 
Botswana 
and South 
Africa 
Institutional 
building (tax 
compliance) 
Improve supply-
side capabilities Yes 
Ordered Probit. 
Tobit, RE 
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Banerjee et al. 
Can Institutions be 
Reformed from Within? 
Evidence from a 
Randomized Experiment 
with the Rajasthan Police 
2012 Working paper India 
Institutional 
building 
Improve supply-
side capabilities Yes FE, DiD 
Humphreys  
et. al 
The Role of Leaders in 
Democratic Deliberations 
Results from a Field 
Experiment in São Tomé 
and Príncipe 
2006 Journal article 
São Tomé 
and Príncipe Leadership 
Improve supply-
side capabilities Yes Leader FE 
Moxnes and 
van der Heijden 
The Effect of Leadership in a 
Public Bad Experiment 2003 
Journal 
article Norway Leadership 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(leadership) 
Yes Pooled OLS 
Edmark Migration Effects of Welfare Benefit Reform 2009 
Journal 
article Sweden Migration 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(benefits) 
No DiD, FE 
Bowles and 
Gintis 
Social Capital and 
Community Governance 2002 
Journal 
article  
Non-electoral 
forms of 
participation 
Improve supply-
side capabilities Yes OLS 
Travers et al. 
Change Behaviour via 
Incentivess for Cooperation: 
The Effects of Institutional 
Controls on Common Pool 
Resource Extraction in 
Cambodia 
2011 Journal article Cambodia 
Non-electoral 
forms of 
participation 
Improve supply-
side capabilities Yes FE 
Cavalcanti  
et al. 
Public Participation and 
Willingness to Cooperate in 
Common-pool Resource 
Management: A Field 
Experiment with Fishing 
Communities in Brazil 
2009 Journal article Brazil 
Non-electoral 
forms of 
participation 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes OLS, ordered Logit, ANOVA 
Yang and 
Pandey 
Further Dissecting the Black 
Box of Citizen Participation: 
When Does Citizen 
Involvement Lead to Good 
Outcomes? 
2011 Journal article USA 
Non-electoral 
forms of 
participation 
Improve supply-
side capabilities No OLS 
Dimitropoulos 
and Kontoleon 
Assessing the Determinants 
of Local Acceptability of 
Wind-farm Investment: A 
Choice Experiment in the 
Greek Aegean Islands  
2009 Journal article Greece 
Non-electoral 
forms of 
participation 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
Yes RPL and MLM 
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Slomczynski 
and Shabad 
Can Support for Democracy 
and the Market Be Learned 
in School? A Natural 
Experiment in Post-
Communist Poland 
1998 Journal article Poland 
Non-electoral 
forms of 
participation 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
No ANOVA 
Gugerty and 
Kremer 
Outside Funding and the 
Dynamics of Participation in 
Community Associations 
2008 Journal article Kenya 
Non-electoral 
forms of 
participation 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
No OLS, Probit 
Beaman et al. Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias? 2009 
Journal 
article India 
Non-electoral 
forms of 
participation 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(women quotas) 
No FE 
Fearon et al. 
Can Development Aid 
Contribute to Social 
Cohesion after Civil War? 
Evidence from a Field 
Experiment in Post-Conflict 
Liberia 
2009 Journal article Liberia 
Social 
Cohesion 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
Yes PSM 
Hyde 
The Observer Effect in 
International Politics: 
Evidence from a Natural 
Experiment 
2007 Journal article Armenia 
Voting 
behaviour 
Improve supply-
side capabilities Yes OLS 
Ichino and 
Schündeln 
Deterring or Displacing 
Electoral Irregularities? Spill 
over Effects of Observers in 
a Randomized Field 
Experiment in Ghana 
2012 Journal article Ghana 
Voting 
behaviour 
Improve supply-
side capabilities Yes OLS, FE, IV 
Hyde 
Experimenting in Democracy 
Promotion: 
International Observers and 
the 2004 Presidential 
Elections in Indonesia 
2010 Journal article Indonesia 
Voting 
behaviour 
Improve supply-
side capabilities Yes OLS, FE 
De La O 
Do Poverty Relief Funds 
Aﬀect Electoral Behavior? 
Evidence from a 
Randomized Experiment in 
Mexico 
2008 Conference Mexico Voting behaviour 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(benefits) 
Yes DiD 
Bhavnani 
Do Electoral Quotas Work 
after They Are Withdrawn? 
Evidence from a Natural 
Experiment in India 
2009 Journal article India 
Voting 
behaviour 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(female quota) 
No Logit 
Humphreys 
and Weinstein 
Policing Politicians: Citizen 
Empowerment and Political 2007 
Conference 
(APSA Uganda 
Voting 
behaviour 
Improve 
Information No Ordered Probit 
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Accountability in Africa 2007) asymmetries 
James 
Performance Measures and 
Democracy: Improve 
Information asymmetries 
Effects on Citizens in Field 
and Laboratory Experiments 
2011 Journal article England 
Voting 
behaviour 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes Probit 
Collier and 
Vicente 
Votes and Violence: 
Evidence from a Field 
Experiment in Nigeria 
2008 Working paper Nigeria 
Voting 
behaviour 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes DiD, FE, Probit 
Esterling et al. 
Means, Motive, and 
Opportunity in Becoming 
Informed about Politics: A 
Deliberative Field 
Experiment with Members of 
Congress and Their 
Constituents 
2011 Journal article USA 
Voting 
behaviour 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes 
Bayesian 
framework 
using MCMC 
with data 
augmentation 
Banerjee et al. 
Do Informed Voters Make 
Better Choices? 
Experimental Evidence from 
Urban India 
2011 Working paper India 
Voting 
behaviour 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes FE 
Ferraz and 
Finin 
Exposing Corrupt Politicians: 
The Effects of Brazil's 
Publicly Released Audits on 
Electoral Outcomes 
2008 Journal article Brazil 
Voting 
behaviour 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes 
FE, DiD, OLS, 
semi-parametric 
estimators 
Chong et al. 
Improve Information 
asymmetries Dissemination 
and Local Governments' 
Electoral Returns, Evidence 
from a Field Experiment in 
Mexico 
2010 Working paper Mexico 
Voting 
behaviour 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes FE, OLS 
Banerjee et al. 
Can Voters be Primed to 
Choose Better Legislators? 
Evidence from Two Field 
Experiments in Rural India 
2009 Working paper India 
Voting 
behaviour 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes IV, FE 
Harbridge and 
Malhotra 
Electoral Change Behaviour 
via Incentivess and Partisan 
Conflict in Congress: 
Evidence from Survey 
Experiments 
2011 Journal article USA 
Voting 
behaviour 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes PSM 
Borges and 
Clarke 
Cues in Context: Analyzing 
the Heuristics of 
Referendum Voting with an 
Internet Survey Experiment 
2008 Journal article USA 
Voting 
behaviour 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes multinomial Logit 
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Vicente and 
Wantchekon 
Clientelism and Vote Buying: 
Lessons from 
Field Experiments in African 
Elections 
2009 Journal article West African 
Voting 
behaviour 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes OLS 
Davenport 
Public Accountability and 
Political Participation: 
Effects of a Face-to-Face 
Feedback Intervention on 
Voter Turnout of Public 
Housing Residents 
2010 Journal article USA 
Voting 
behaviour 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes OLS, Probit and 2SLS 
Giné and 
Mansuri 
Together We Will: Evidence 
from a Field Experiment on 
Female Voter Turnout in 
Pakistan 
2011 Working paper Pakistan 
Voting 
behaviour 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes OLS and FE 
Gerber et al. 
Party Affiliation, 
Partisanship, and Political 
Beliefs: A Field Experiment 
2010 Journal article USA 
Voting 
behaviour 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes OLS, 2SLS 
Gerber et al. 
Social Pressure and Voter 
Turnout: Evidence from a 
Large-Scale Field 
Experiment 
2008 Journal article USA 
Voting 
behaviour 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes OLS, FE 
Guan and 
Green 
Noncoercive Mobilization in 
State-Controlled Elections 2006 
Journal 
article China 
Voting 
behaviour 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes OLS 
Wantchekon 
Clientelism and Voting 
Behavior: Evidence from a 
Field Experiment in Benin 
2003 Journal article Benin 
Voting 
behaviour 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes Probit 
Wantchekon 
Can Informed Public 
Deliberation Overcome 
Clientelism? Experimental 
Evidence from Benin 
2009 Working paper Benin 
Voting 
behaviour 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes Probit, FE 
Pande 
Can Informed Voters 
Enforce Better Governance? 
Experiments in Low-Income 
Democracies 
2011 Journal article  
Voting 
behaviour 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes OLS 
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Buttenheim  
et al. 
Impact Evaluation of School 
Feeding Programmes in Lao 
PDR 
2011 Working paper Lao Education 
Improve 
supply-side 
capabilities 
No DiD, PSM and FE 
Koball 
Living Arrangements and 
School Dropout Among 
Minor Mothers Following 
Welfare Reform 
2007 Journal article USA Education 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
No DiD 
Singer and 
Stater 
Going, Going, Gone: The 
Effects of Aid Policies on 
Graduation at Three Large 
Public Institutions 
2006 Journal article USA Education 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
No OLS 
Baulch 
The Medium-Term Impact of 
the Primary Education 
Stipend in Rural Bangladesh 
2010 Discussion Paper Bangladesh Education 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
No PSM, DiD 
Duflo and 
Hanna 
Monitoring Works: Getting 
Teachers to Come to School 2005 
Working 
paper India Education 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
Yes OLS and 2SLS 
Kremer et al. Change Behaviour via Incentivess to Learn 2009 
Journal 
article Kenya Education 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
Yes OLS 
Kremer et al. Decentralization: A Cautionary Tale 2003 
Working 
paper Kenya Education 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
Yes OLS, RE 
Kim and Joo 
Did PRWORA's Mandatory 
School Attendance Policy 
Increase Attendance Among 
Targeted Teenage Girls? 
2011 Journal article USA Education 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(benefits) 
No DiD 
Reinikka and 
Svensson 
The Power of Improve 
Information Asymmetries in 
Public Services: Evidence 
from Education in Uganda 
2011 Journal article Uganda Education 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
No FE, IV 
Reinikka and 
Svensson 
Local Capture: Evidence 
from a Central Government 
Transfer Programme in 
Uganda 
2004 Journal article Uganda Education 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
No FE, RE 
Dee 
Conditional Cash Penalties 
in Education: Evidence from 
the Learn Fare Experiment 
2011 Journal article USA Education 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
Yes FE 
Pande et al. 
Community Participation in 
Public Schools: Impact of 
Improve Information 
Asymmetries Campaigns in 
2009 Journal article India 
Education + 
Accountability 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes DiD 
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Three Indian states 
Patrinos and 
Sakellariou 
Schooling and Labor Market 
Impacts of a Natural Policy 
Experiment 
2005 Journal article Venezuela 
Education + 
Employment 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(policy) 
No IV 
Meghir et al. 
Education, Health and 
Mortality: Evidence from a 
Social Experiment 
2011 Working paper Sweden 
Education + 
health 
Improve 
supply-side 
capabilities 
No CPHR, OLS 
Gao et al. 
How Does Public Assistance 
Affect Family Expenditures? 
The Case of Urban China 
2010 Journal article China 
Education + 
Health 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
No PSM 
Monstad et al. 
Education and Fertility: 
Evidence from a Natural 
Experiment 
2008 Journal article Norway 
Education + 
Health 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(reform) 
No 2SLS 
Miguel and 
Kremer 
Worms: Identifying Impacts 
on Education and Health in 
the Presence of Treatment 
Externalities 
2004 Journal article Kenya 
Education and 
Health 
Improve 
supply-side 
capabilities 
Yes OLS 
Fan et al. 
Propensity Score 
Techniques to Evaluate 
Returns of College 
Education 
2009 Conference Paper China Employment 
Improve 
supply-side 
capabilities 
No PSM 
Micklewright 
and Nagy 
The Effect of Monitoring 
Unemployment Insurance 
Recipients on 
Unemployment Duration: 
Evidence from a Field 
Experiment 
2009 Journal article Hungary Employment 
Improve 
supply-side 
capabilities 
Yes CPHR, OLS 
Duflo and Saez 
The Role of Improve 
Information Asymmetries 
and Social Interactions in 
Retirement Plan Decisions: 
Evidence from a 
Randomized Experiment 
2003 Journal article USA Employment 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
Yes OLS, FE and IV 
van Ours and 
Vodopivec 
How Shortening the 
Potential Duration of 
Unemployment Benefits 
Affects the Duration of 
Unemployment: Evidence 
from a Natural Experiment 
2006 Journal article Slovenia Employment 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(benefits) 
No DiD 
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Campolietia 
and Riddell 
Disability Policy and the 
Labor Market: Evidence 
from a Natural Experiment in 
Canada, 1998-2006 
2011 Journal article Canada Employment 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(earning 
exceptions) 
No DiD 
Washbrook  
et al. 
Public Policies, Women's 
Employment after 
Childbearing, and Child 
Well-Being 
2011 Journal article USA Employment 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(policy) 
No DiD 
Ziebarth and 
Karlsson 
A Natural Experiment on 
Sick Pay Cuts, Sickness 
Absence, and Labor Costs 
2010 Journal article Germany Employment 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(reform) 
No DiD, PSM 
Boeri and 
Tabellini 
Does Information Increase 
Political Support For 
Pension Reform? 
2010 Journal article Italy Employment 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes Probit, PSM 
Zhou et al. 
Community Effectiveness of 
Stove and Health Education 
Interventions for 
Reducing Exposure to 
Indoor Air Pollution 
from Solid Fuels in Four 
Chinese Provinces 
2006 Journal article China Health * No DiD 
Liu et al. 
The Expansion of Public 
Health Insurance and the 
Demand for Private Health 
Insurance in Rural China 
2010 Journal article China Health 
Improve 
supply-side 
capabilities 
No DiD 
Cooper et al. 
Does Competition Improve 
Public Hospitals’ Efficiency? 
Evidence from a Quasi-
Experiment in the English 
National Health Service 
2012 Discussion Paper England Health 
Improve 
supply-side 
capabilities 
No DiD, FE 
Jesmin et al. 
Does Team-based Primary 
Health Care Improve 
Patients’ Perception of 
outcomes? Evidence from 
the 2007-08 Canadian 
Survey of Experiences with 
Primary Health 
2012 Journal article Canada Health 
Improve 
supply-side 
capabilities 
No PSM 
Chadwick et al. 
Effects of Downsizing 
Practices on the 
Performance of Hospitals 
2004 Journal article USA Health 
Improve 
supply-side 
capabilities 
No OLS, Logit 
Steinhardt et al. Removing User Fees for 2011 Journal Afghanistan Health Change No DiD 
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Basic Health Services: A 
Pilot Study And National 
Roll-out in Afghanistan 
article behaviour via 
incentives 
Basinga et al. 
Effect on Maternal and Child 
Health Services in Rwanda 
of Payment to Primary 
Health-Care Providers for 
Performance: an Impact 
Evaluation 
2011 Journal article Rwanda Health 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
No DiD, FE 
Nguyen et al. 
Encouraging Maternal 
Health Service Utilization: 
An Evaluation of the 
Bangladesh Voucher 
Programme 
2012 Journal article Bangladesh Health 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
No DiD, FE 
Thanh et al. 
An Assessment of the 
Implementation of the Health 
Care Funds for the Poor 
Policy in Rural Vietnam 
2010 Journal article Vietnam Health 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
No DiD, PSM 
Schreyögg and 
Grabka 
Co-payments for Ambulatory 
Care in Germany: a Natural 
Experiment Using A 
Difference-in-Difference 
Approach 
2010 Journal article Germany Health 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
No Logit, DiD 
Arntz and 
Thomsen 
Crowding Out Informal 
Care? Evidence from a Field 
Experiment in Germany 
2011 Journal article Germany Health 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
Yes DiD, FE, Probit 
Thanh et al. 
Does ‘the Injury Poverty 
Trap’ Exist?: A Longitudinal 
Study in Bavi, Vietnam 
2006 Journal article Vietnam Health 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(injury) 
No PSM 
Quimbo et al. 
Evidence of a Causal Link 
Between Health Outcomes, 
Insurance Coverage, and a 
Policy to Expand Access: 
Experimental Data from 
Children in the Philippines 
2011 Journal article Philippines Health 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(policy) 
No DiD 
Trujillo et al. 
The Impact of Subsidized 
Health Insurance for the 
Poor: Evaluating the 
Colombian Experience 
Using Propensity Score 
Matching 
2005 Journal article Colombia Health 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(policy) 
No PSM 
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King et al. 
A ‘Politically Robust’ 
Experimental Design for 
Public Policy Evaluation, 
With Application to the 
Mexican Universal Health 
Insurance programme 
2007 Journal article Mexico Health 
Improve 
supply-side 
capabilities 
Yes PSM, OLS 
Propper et al. 
Change Behaviour Via 
Incentivess and Targets in 
Hospital Care: Evidence 
From A Natural Experiment 
2010 Journal article 
United 
Kingdom Health 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(policy) 
No DiD 
Rodriguez et al. 
A Randomized Experiment 
of Issue Framing and Voter 
Support of Tax Increases for 
Health Insurance Expansion 
2010 Journal article USA Health 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes ANOVA, OLS 
Justesen 
Democracy, Dictatorship, 
and Disease: Political 
Regimes and HIV/AIDS 
2012 Journal article  
Health + 
democracy 
Improve 
supply-side 
capabilities 
No PSM 
Braakmann 
The Causal Relationship 
Between Education, Health 
and Health Related 
Behaviour: Evidence from a 
Natural Experiment in 
England 
2011 Journal article England 
Health + 
Education 
Improve 
supply-side 
capabilities 
No OLS and IV 
Velamuri Taxes, Health Insurance and Women’s Self-employment 2012 
Journal 
article USA 
Health + 
Employment 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(health 
insurance) 
No DiD 
Behrman et al. 
Evaluating Preschool 
Programs When Length of 
Exposure to the Programme 
Varies: A Nonparametric 
Approach 
2004 Journal article Bolivia 
Health + 
Nutrition + 
Education 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(day-care, 
nutrition, 
education) 
No PSM 
Björkman and 
Svensson 
Power to the People: 
Evidence from a 
Randomized Field 
Experiment on Community-
Based Monitoring in Uganda 
2009 Journal article Uganda 
Health + 
participation 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes FE, DiD 
 32
Poder and He 
How can Infrastructures 
Reduce Child Malnutrition 
and Health Inequalities? 
Evidence from Guatemala 
2011 Working paper Guatemala 
Health and 
nutrition 
Improve 
supply-side 
capabilities 
No PSM 
Schwartz et al. 
The External Effects of 
Place-based Subsidized 
Housing 
2006 Journal article USA Housing 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(policy) 
No DiD, FE 
Desai and 
Tarozzi 
Microcredit, Family Planning 
Programmes, and 
Contraceptive Behavior: 
Evidence From a Field 
Experiment in Ethiopia 
2011 Journal article Ethiopia 
microcredit + 
health 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes DiD, IV 
Banerjee et al. 
Pitfalls of Participatory 
Programmes: Evidence from 
a Randomized Evaluation in 
Education in India 
2010 Journal article India 
Non-electoral 
forms of 
participation 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes IV, Pooled OLS 
Galasso and 
Umapathi 
Improving Nutritional Status 
through Behavioral Change: 
Lessons from Madagascar 
2007 Working paper Madagascar Nutrition 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
No DiD, PSM, FE 
Domínguez-
Torreiro and 
Soliño 
Provided and Perceived 
Status Quo in Choice 
Experiments: Implications 
for Valuing the Outputs of 
Multifunctional Rural Areas 
2011 Journal article Spain 
Rural 
development 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
Yes OLS, RPL 
De Jaeger 
Residual Household Waste: 
From Pay-Per-Bag To Pay-
Per-Kilogram. An Evaluation 
Study for Flanders 
2010 Journal article Flanders Sanitation 
Improve 
supply-side 
capabilities 
No DiD 
Gregg et al. 
Family Expenditures Post-
welfare reform in the UK: 
Are Low-Income Families 
Starting To Catch Up? 
2006 Journal article 
United 
Kingdom 
Social 
Protection 
Improve 
supply-side 
capabilities 
No DiD 
Leroy et al. 
The Oportunidades 
Programme Increases the 
Linear Growth of Children 
Enrolled at Young Ages in 
Urban Mexico 
2008 Journal article Mexico 
Social 
Protection 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
No DiD, PSM 
Baird et al. 
Cash or Condition? 
Evidence from a Cash 
Transfer Experiment 
2010 Working paper Malawi 
Social 
Protection 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
Yes OLS, FE 
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de Hoop et al. 
Do Cash Transfers Crowd 
Out Community Investment 
in Public Goods? Lessons 
from a Field Experiment on 
Health Education 
2011 Journal article Peru 
Social 
Protection 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(funding 
health 
education) 
Yes OLS 
Stecklov et al. 
Unintended Effects of 
Poverty Programmes on 
Childbearing in Less 
Developed Countries: 
Experimental Evidence from 
Latin America 
2007 Journal article 
Latin 
America 
Social 
Protection 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentivess 
Yes DiD 
Pattanayak 
et al. 
How Valuable Are 
Environmental Health 
Interventions? Evaluation of 
Water and Sanitation 
Programmes in India 
2010 Journal article India 
Water and 
Sanitation 
Improve 
supply-side 
capabilities 
No DiD 
Hope 
Evaluating Social Impacts of 
Watershed Development in 
India 
2007 Journal article India 
Water and 
Sanitation 
Improve 
supply-side 
capabilities 
No PSM 
Veettil et al. 
Complementarity Between 
Water Pricing, Water Rights 
And Local Water 
Governance: A Bayesian 
Analysis of Choice 
Behaviour of Farmers in the 
Krishna River Basin, India 
2011 Journal article India 
Water and 
Sanitation 
Change 
behaviour via 
incentives 
(models) 
Yes 
OLS, 
Multinomial 
Probit 
Pattanayak  
et al. 
Shame or Subsidy 
Revisited: Social 
Mobilization for Sanitation in 
Orissa, India 
2009 Journal article India 
Water and 
Sanitation 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
No DiD 
Kurz et al. 
Utilizing a Social-Ecological 
Framework to Promote 
Water and Energy 
Conservation: A Field 
Experiment 
2005 Journal article Australia 
Water and 
Sanitation 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes ANOVA 
Watson et al. 
An Opportunistic Field 
Experiment in Community 
Water Conservation 
1999 Journal article Australia 
Water and 
Sanitation 
Improve 
Information 
asymmetries 
Yes MANOVA, OLS 
Moehler 
Democracy, Governance, 
and Randomized 
Development Assistance 
2010 Journal article World  
Improve 
supply-side 
capabilities 
Yes Review article 
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Notes: 1/ Abbreviations stand as follows: Principal Component Analysis (PCA); Ordinary Least Squares (OLS); Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS), Weighted-least-squares 
(WLS), Fixed Effects (FE), Random Effects (RE), Propensity Score Matching (PSM), Difference-in-Difference (DiD), Analysis of variance (ANOVA), Multivariate analysis of 
variance (MANOVA), Random Parameter Logit (RPL), Mixed Logit Model (MLM), Regression Discontinuity (RD), Cox proportional hazard regressions (CPHR), Random 
Parameter Logit (RPL). 
Source: Adapted from Gisselquist, Niño-Zarazúa and Sajuría (forthcoming). 
